Understanding Gasoline Price Dispersion by Yilmazkuday, Demet & Yilmazkuday, Hakan
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
Economics Research Working Paper Series Department of Economics
5-26-2016
Understanding Gasoline Price Dispersion
Demet Yilmazkuday
Florida International University
Hakan Yilmazkuday
Florida International University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/economics_wps
Part of the Economics Commons
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Research Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yilmazkuday, Demet and Yilmazkuday, Hakan, "Understanding Gasoline Price Dispersion" (2016). Economics Research Working Paper
Series. 109.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/economics_wps/109
Understanding Gasoline Price Dispersion
Demet Yilmazkudayy and Hakan Yilmazkudayz
May 26, 2016
Abstract
This paper models and estimates the gasoline price dispersion across time and space
by using a unique data set at the gas-station level within the U.S.. Nationwide e¤ects
(measured by time xed e¤ects or crude oil prices) explain up to about 51% of the gaso-
line price dispersion across stations. Renery-specic costs, which have been ignored
in the literature due to using local data sets within the U.S., contribute up to another
33% to the price dispersion. While state taxes explain about 12% of the price disper-
sion, spatial factors such as local agglomeration externalities, land prices, distribution
costs of gasoline explain up to about 4%. The contribution of brand-specic factors is
relatively minor.
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1. Introduction
Retail prices of gasoline are considerably di¤erent across gas stations within the U.S. where
consumer expenditure share of gasoline is about 5%. Since such price di¤erences may be
reecting the frictions in the economy, understanding the reasons behind them is the key to
an optimal policy that would improve the level and distribution of individual welfare. For
example, consider a typical day in 2010-2011 when the retail-level gasoline price di¤erence
between any two gas stations within the U.S. was as high as $2.25 (followed by $2.19) per
gallon of regular gas.1 If you think that this price dispersion was due to di¤erences in state-
taxes per gallon, which ranged between 46.6 cents (for California) and 8 cents (for Alaska)
in 2010 and between 49.6 cents (for Connecticut) and 8 cents (in Alaska) in 2011, you are
only partially right, because, for a typical day of the very same sample period, the price
di¤erence between any two gas stations within any given state/district of the U.S. was as
high as $1.57 (for Washington D.C. on October 15th, 2010) followed by $0.99 (for Iowa for
October 10th, 2010).2 Therefore, gasoline price di¤erences not only exist across states but
also within states; accordingly, a detailed spatial analysis (rather than a state-level analysis)
is required to understand the details behind gasoline price dispersion.
We pursue such an investigation by testing the implications of a spatial model (of gasoline
1The gasoline price di¤erences of both $2.25 and $2.19 were between Washington D.C. and Michigan on
October 23rd, 2010 and December 16th, 2010, respectively
2The gasoline price dispersion was not due to outliers, either; because, for a typical day, the median price
di¤erence between any two gas stations within any given state/district of the U.S. was as high as $0.60 (for
Hawaii) followed by $0.44 (for Washington D.C.) and by $0.41 (for Wyoming). Table 1 depicts the complete
descriptive statistics.
consumption, production, and distribution) with a comprehensive gas-station level gasoline
retail price data (with about half a million price observations) obtained from all around the
U.S.3 In the model, consumer-producers get utility out of their consumption of goods as well
as gasoline which is required for transportation purposes. The necessity for transportation
also depends on the distribution of economic activity around the individual who is assigned a
specic spatial location. Spatially distributed gas stations maximize their prots based on the
gasoline demand of consumer-producers who are involved in economic activity around the gas
station. Gas stations also take into account the cost of gasoline (charged by nearest reners)
and other spatial factors (such as the size and the distribution of economic activity around
the gas station, the distance of the gas station to the renery, number of other gas stations in
the vicinity). Optimization implies that the equilibrium price of gasoline at a particular gas
station depends on spatial economic factors, the cost of gasoline at the renery, legislative
factors (such as state-level taxes), local competition, and brand-specic costs/benets. We
test the implications of this model on the gasoline price di¤erence across gas stations using
a unique data set that is introduced next.
The daily gasoline price data set covering the period between September 10th, 2010
and January 31st, 2011 involves brand information of gas stations as well as their location
information at the exact address level. Combining this data set with the exact (address-level)
3Studies such as Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2007) have used the state-level price observations and shown that
(i) the gasoline price dispersion within the U.S. is due to changes in the price of crude oil; and (ii) across-
state variation in prices can be attributed to demand variation, as well as di¤erences in taxes, environmental
regulations and market power. In addition to such studies, this paper attempts to explain the spatial gasoline
price di¤erences within states.
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location information of oil reneries, state-level taxes, crude oil prices, land prices (at the
zip-code level), and local agglomeration externalities of spatial gasoline demand (namely,
the distribution of nighttime lights data across space), we decompose the e¤ects of crude oil
prices, renery costs, distribution costs, brand-specic costs, state taxes, land prices, and
local agglomeration externalities (i.e., spatial demand and number of competitors) through
a spatial analysis that models and estimates the transportation needs of individuals and
distribution of gasoline from reneries to gas stations. While the crude oil prices (or any
other time-varying e¤ect that is common across gas stations) are considered to capture time-
varying e¤ects that are common across all gas stations within the U.S., other cross-sectional
variables are considered to capture the e¤ects due to spatial factors.
The empirical results show that one percent of an increase in local agglomeration exter-
nalities reduces gasoline prices up to 1:92%, while one percent of an increase in the number
of competitors can reduce gasoline prices as much as 0:19%. Distribution costs of gasoline
from the nearest rener to the gas station have positive and signicant e¤ects, where one
percent of an increase in distribution costs leads to an increase up to about 0.41% in gasoline
prices. It is also shown that one percent of an increase in land prices leads to an increase
up to about 0:79% in gasoline prices. These results are robust to the consideration of brand
xed e¤ects, time xed e¤ects, renery xed e¤ects, and alternative spatial measures (for the
matching between consumer-producers and gas stations). It is also shown that the proposed
model explains the data well; the R-squared values for alternative spatial measures are all
about 0.90.
We further investigate the contribution of each model component in explaining the gaso-
line price di¤erences across gas stations. The corresponding variance decomposition of gaso-
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line prices across time and space suggests that the highest contribution is by time xed e¤ects
(or crude oil prices) capturing up to 51% (or 39%) of the price dispersion (i.e., nationwide
e¤ects are almost half of the overall e¤ects), followed by renery-specic costs capturing up
to 33% of the price dispersion, state taxes capturing up to 12% of price dispersion, and spatial
factors (such as local agglomeration externalities, land prices, distribution costs of gasoline)
capturing up to 4% of price dispersion. The contribution of brand-specic costs is relatively
minor. Within this picture, as discussed in details in the next section, the main contribution
to the existing literature has been to show that renery-specic costs explain a big part of
the price dispersion across gas stations, which has been mostly ignored in the literature due
to using local data sets covering either a couple of cities or states within the U.S..
2. Literature Review
This paper is connected to the empirical literature analyzing the determinants of gasoline
price dispersion at the gas station level. The literature has focused on price control variables
such as (i) local demographics or station location (LDSL), (ii) brand or contractual arrange-
ments (BCA), (iii) station density or local concentration (SDLC), and (iv) physical station
characteristics (PSC).4
In the literature, Shepard (1993) has used cross-sectional gasoline price data collected over
a twelve week period in the rst quarter of 1987 from over 1,100 gas stations from Eastern
Massachusetts. Shepard has shown that prices across stations vary with the contractual form
between reners and stations, with the number, proximity and characteristics of competing
retailers, and with station characteristics such as selling non-gasoline products or services; but
4See Eckert (2013) for a survey of empirical studies of gasoline retailing.
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prices do not vary with market conditions such as tra¢ c volume. Ning and Haining (2003)
have used gasoline price data collected over eight biweekly period in mostly the rst quarter of
1995 from 113 gas stations, together with price data collected over six weekly period in mostly
the rst quarter of 1997 from 96 gas stations, from She¢ eld, England. They have shown that
spatial competition and being attached to a supermarket are statistically signicant, but the
number of cars around the gas station and/or percentage of higher income households in
the neighborhood of a station are not statistically signicant. Van Meerbeeck (2003) has
used gasoline price data covering 477 gas stations in Belgium on a daily basis between 1998
and 2001. This data set includes only two brands of gasoline (Shell and TotalFina). Van
Meerbeeck has observed that prices vary with stations located along a highway always charge
the maximum price determined by an agreement between the oil industry and the Belgian
government, and prices are below the maximum price in markets with su¢ cient competition
and that the number of local competitors does not have a large impact on retail gasoline
prices. Barron et al. (2004) have used cross-sectional gasoline price data covering 3,197
gas stations in four metropolitan areas (Phoenix, AZ, Tuscon, AZ San Diego, CA, and San
Francisco, CA) for only one day in 1997 (where that one day di¤ers across metropolitan
areas). They have found that an increase in station density consistently decreases both price
levels and price dispersion across four geographical areas. They have also found that price
vary with brand identiers, with a variable indicating whether the primary image of the
station is a convenience store or a repair station, with a variable indicating whether full-
service gasoline is sold at the station, and with a variable reecting the number of fueling
positions. Eckert and West (2004) have used daily gasoline price data covering several gas
stations over a period of eight months in 2000 from Vancouver and Ottawa metropolitan
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areas in Canada. They have shown that brand identities, concentration of gas stations,
and the type of ownership are signicant in explaining price di¤erences across gas stations.
Clemenz and Gugler (2006) have used daily gasoline price data collected over a ve month
period in 2000 and 2001 covering 1,603 gas stations from in Austria. They have found that
prices vary with station density, but ownership concentration is not statistically signicant.
Pennerstorfer (2009) has used cross-sectional price data covering 400 gas stations in Lower
Austria for September 2003. Pennerstorfer has shown that prices vary with branded versus
unbranded gas stations. Chandra and Tapatta (2011) have used daily gas-station level data
covering the states of California, Florida, Texas, and New Jersey covering the 18 months
period between January 2006 to May 2007. They have shown that price dispersion increases
with the number of rms in the market and consumer search costs.
Compared to the literature mentioned so far, this paper uses gasoline price data of an
unbalanced daily panel over 144 days from 38,245 gas stations from all around the U.S.
In addition to the literature, we have found that rener xed e¤ects are econometrically
signicant in explaining gasoline prices, which is the key in understanding the spatial gasoline
price dispersion within the U.S. and has been ignored by the existing literature focusing on
local data sets. In particular, having a local-level analysis (as in the existing literature)
would suppress the main determinants of gasoline prices such as renery e¤ects, because
many gas stations within the same location would already face similar local input costs
due to purchasing gasoline from the same (or closeby) reners. In contrast, employing a
nationwide spatial analysis in this paper has allowed for comparisons across locations, which
have resulted in depicting the high contribution of renery xed e¤ects (among others, as
6
discussed, above) to the spatial gasoline-price dispersion.5 Furthermore, considering gasoline
price dispersion at the gas-station level across time and space within the U.S., we also show
that time xed e¤ects (capturing crude oil price changes as well as other time-varying costs
common across gas stations) contribute most, followed in descending order of magnitude
by LDSL (i.e., the sum of the e¤ects of renery costs due to the station location, spatial
demand, and land prices), legislative e¤ects (i.e., state-level taxes), SDLC (i.e., number of
competitors) and BCA (i.e., brand identities).
3. The Economic Environment
We would like to model the details of (i) the retail chain in the U.S. gasoline market (to the
degree that our data allow us), (ii) price-setting behavior of gas stations, and (iii) the spatial
distribution of economic activity among individuals. Regarding the retail chain in the U.S.
gasoline market, at least 90% of the gasoline sold at retail-level gas stations is produced by
rening crude oil (because up to 10% of the retail-level gasoline may be ethanol in the U.S.).
The gasoline produced at the renery is then either directly transported to gas stations by
truck or to local distribution/bulk terminals by pipeline, barge or rail. In the latter case,
local distribution terminals add some additives such as ethanol or brand-specic ingredients
(e.g., Chevron including Techron into its gasoline) and sell the nal version of gasoline to
5To further understand the e¤ects of rener xed e¤ects on the spatial distribution of gasoline prices, one
may also consider the renery-related price jumps in California in October 2012, where gasoline prices were
as high as $5 at the gas-station level, while the nationwide average was only about $3.82. Please visit
http://moneyland.time.com/2012/10/08/so-much-for-cheaper-gas-pump-prices-go-haywire-in-california/ for
more details.
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retail-level gas stations where transportation is mostly achieved by trucks. Studies such as
Borenstein et al. (1997) and Kleit (2005) have depicted more details about the gasoline
production and distribution within the U.S. Within this picture, since (i) our primary data
set is for retail gasoline prices at the gas station level, (ii) our secondary data set is for
the location of reneries, and (iii) we do not have any data on distribution terminals, we
only model the production of gasoline at the reneries and the distribution of gasoline from
reneries to the gas stations; i.e., we skip modeling local distribution terminals and include
the possible injection of additives in the production function of gas stations. Accordingly, as
in Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2007) or Doyle and Samphantharak (2008), we assume that each
gas station purchases gasoline from the nearest rener.
We model the gasoline demand of individuals/producers in a spatial context. A typical
individual s produces a particular amount of good s to sell; this is the only source of income
for individual s. To match individuals with space, we also denote the location/space that
is used for the economic activity of the individual by s. Individual s consumes gasoline
and other goods purchased from other individuals around her. The transportation needs of
individual s also depends on the distribution of economic activity around her; e.g., a dispersed
city like Miami, FL may require more transportation than a compact city like San Francisco,
CA.
Spatially distributed gas stations maximize their prots based on the gasoline demand
of individuals, the cost of gasoline (charged by nearest reners), and other spatial factors.
Optimization implies that the price of gasoline at a particular gas station depends on spatial
economic factors (such as the size and the distribution of economic activity around the gas
station, the distance of the gas station to the renery, number of other gas stations in the
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vicinity), the cost of gasoline at the renery (reecting the changes in oil prices), legislative
factors (such as state-level taxes), local competition, and brand-specic costs/benets.
Although the model is mostly static in technical terms, the time dimension comes into
picture through state-level taxes, land prices, and time-varying crude oil prices. To keep the
notation simple, we will skip the time dimension until the end of this section.
3.1. Individuals
The unique individual s at location s 2 Slats ; Slons , with Slats and Slons representing the
latitude and longitude intervals, has the utility given by:
Us  logCs   !Ys (3.1)
where Cs is an aggregate index of consumption and !Ys is the disutility due to producing Ys
amount of good s. Consumption of goods is combined with usage of gasoline that is assumed
to depend on the spatial distribution of economic activity around individual s. Accordingly,
Cs is dened by the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator:
Cs =

(Qs)
 1
 + (Ds)
  1
 (Gs)
 1

 
 1
where Qs is an aggregate index of goods, Gs is the consumption of gasoline, and Ds repre-
sents the spatial distribution of economic activity around individual/location s. Therefore,
individual s has a higher preference toward gasoline (i.e., a higher value of Ds) if she is living
in a neighborhood with a more dispersed economic activity.6
6This modeling approach considers distance-related costs in an indirect way through the spatial distri-
bution of economic activity. An alternative approach may be to consider the distance-related disutility of
individuals from going to any gas station in a direct way. However, there is no empirical evidence in the
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Individual s sells her product Ys to other individuals at a price of ss, which is further
used to maximize utility subject to the following budget constraint:
CsPs  Ysss (3.2)
where Ps (to be further dened, below) is the price index for Cs. Utility maximization results
in the following expression for the amount of good s produced:7
Ys =
1
!
(3.3)
The optimal allocation of expenditure yields the following demand functions for Qs and Gs:
Qs =

s
Ps
 
Cs (3.4)
and
Gs = Ds

Rs
Ps
 
Cs (3.5)
where s and Rs are the prices of Qs and Gs, respectively. It is implied that Ps is connected
to s and Rs as follows:
Ps 
 
(s)
1  +Ds (Rs)
1  11  (3.6)
Individual s can satisfy her aggregate gasoline demand of Gs from di¤erent gas stations
around her through another CES aggregator:
Gs =
 X
g2Ss
(Ns)
  1
 (Ggs)
 1

! 
 1
(3.7)
literature for such a consideration; moreover, we do not have any data (that match individuals with gas
stations) that can be used to test the implications in such a case. In sum, we believe that we have the best
available modeling approach given the data and empirical evidence in the literature.
7This is also the expression one can get with a modeling strategy which endows each individual with 1!
unit of product.
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where g 2 Ss represents the set of gas stations around individual s, Ggs is the gasoline demand
of individual s at gas station g (which is around individual/location s), and Ns is the number
of gas stations around individual/location s. The optimal allocation of gasoline expenditure
yields the following demand function of individual s at gas station g:
Ggs =
1
Ns

Rg
Rs
 
Gs (3.8)
=
DsXs (R
g) 
Ns
where Xs = (Ps)
 Cs is a measure of the size/scale of economic activity of individual s, and
Rg is the retail price of gasoline (per gallon) at gas station g that satises:
Rs 
 X
g2Ss
(Rg)1 
Ns
! 1
1 
(3.9)
3.2. Gas Stations
Since we do not model local distribution terminals, we include the possible injection of
additives (e.g., Chevron injecting Techron into its gasoline) in the production function of gas
stations. In particular, gas station g of brand b located at location g produces Y g gallons of
gas according to:
Y g =
(Kg) (Bg) (Hg)1  
Ag
where Kg is the amount of gasoline purchased from the nearest renery, Bg is the brand-
specic additives included into the gasoline, Hg is the land/area, and Ag is the productivity
which is assumed to be subject to local agglomeration/Marshallian externalities:
Ag =
fGg fN g1 
 (1    )1  
11
where fGg represents the size and spatial distribution of economic activity around gas station
g, fN g is the number of gas stations around gas station g, and  and (1  ) are the parameters
governing the strength of production externalities.8 The gas station chooses Kg taking the
price set by the nearest renery as given. The cost minimization results in the following
marginal cost of production:
M g =
(Wr (1 + 
g
r))
 (bg) (hg)1  fGg fN g1  (3.10)
where Wr is the price of gasoline charged by the nearest renery r,  gr represents transport
cost of gasoline from the nearest renery r to gas station g, bg is the price of brand-specic
ingredients/additives, and hg is the price of land. On top of the marginal cost of production,
gas station g also pays (net) gasoline taxes of tg. Considering such additional costs, gas
station g sets its price by maximizing its prot of:
g = (Rg  M g (1 + tg))Y g
subject to the demand for gasoline at gas station g.
We need to match individuals with gas stations to calculate the demand for gasoline at
gas station g. Accordingly, we will model individuals purchasing gasoline from gas stations
around them. Although "around them" is an uncertain concept, we will dene it in detail
and provide alternative measures for it in the Appendix covering the details of the data. For
now, we will simply consider that any individual s around gas station g will have a demand
for gasoline at gas station g given by Equation 3.8. The number of individuals, however,
will change with respect to the spatial measure of location considered. As a result, the total
8For simplicity, the denominator has been selected to get rid of the constant terms in the calculation of
marginal cost, below.
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demand is given by: X
s2Sg
Ggs = (R
g) 
X
s2Sg
DsXs
Ns
where s 2 Sg represents the set of individuals around gas station g. Substituting this ex-
pression into the market clearing condition, we have Y g =
P
s2Sg G
g
s, which implies that the
optimal retail price of gasoline for gas station g can be obtained as:
Rg = M g (1 + tg) (3.11)
where M g is already given in Equation 3.10, and 

= 
 1

represents the gross markup.
3.3. Reners
Rener r produces Yr units of gasoline according to a linear production function:
Yr = Or
where Or is the amount of crude oil used as an input. The renery chooses Or taking its
price as given. The cost minimization results in the following marginal cost of production:
Mr = W
o (1 +  or) (1  T ) (3.12)
where W o is the price of crude oil at the oil eld,  or represents net transport costs of crude
oil from the oil eld to the renery, and T represents subsidies/transfers received. Since we
do not have any price data for reners, rather than complicating the model with unnecessary
details, we simply assume that the rener sets its price equal to its marginal cost:9
Wr = W
o (1 +  or) (1  T ) (3.13)
9In the empirical analysis below, we will use rener xed e¤ects to capture any other detail (that is
common through time) of the gasoline prices charged by reners that have not been modeled here.
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As in the case of gas stations, although we accept the location of reners given in our
empirical investigation, we assume that the location-selection problem of reners has already
been achieved in an upper-level optimization (that has resulted in a zero-prot condition
under the simple assumption of free entry).
3.4. Closing the Model
For simplicity, we close the model by assuming that (i) gas stations and land are owned
by reners with equal shares among them (although they are managed independently so
that they have their own optimization problems), and (ii) tax revenues are used to subsidize
reners. Accordingly, gas station prots, tax revenues, and land income are transferred to
all reners through T in Equation 3.12, where T , which is common across reners, is chosen
in such a way that the total amount of subsidies/transfers is equal to the total amount of
gas station prots, tax revenues, and land income for each time period.
3.5. Time Dimension
The time dimension of the model comes from the price of crude oil W o (which is an input for
the rener), taxes tg (which can be di¤erent between legislative years), land prices hg (subject
to changes due to local markets that we do not model), gas station markups  (determined
on a daily basis, since marginal costs may change every day), and transfers to reners T
(capturing time-varying gas station prots, tax revenues, and land income). Accordingly,
using Equations 3.10 and 3.13, the gasoline price expression for gas station g (i.e., Equation
14
3.11) can be rewritten as follows, this time with the time dimension:
Rgt =
(W ot (1 + 
o
r) (1  Tt) (1 +  gr)) (bg) (hgt )1   (1 + tgt )tfGg fN g1  (3.14)
This is the expression of which log version we estimate below, where fGg and fN g are assumed
to be constant over time.
4. Empirical Analysis
This section depicts the estimation methodology, details of the variance decomposition analy-
sis, and empirical results. We estimate the log version of Equation 3.14 by matching the
details of the model with the data as detailed in the Appendix through Equations 7.1, 7.4,
7.5, and 7.6.
4.1. Estimation Methodology
Using the data denitions in the Appendix, the log gasoline prices can be written as follows:
logRgt =  log (W
o
t (1  Tt)t)| {z }
Time Fixed E¤ects
+  log (1 +  or)| {z }
Renery Fixed E¤ects
+  log (dgr)| {z }
Distance to Renery
(4.1)
   log (g)| {z }
S.D. of Nighttime Lights
  (1  ) log
fN g| {z }
# of Nearby Stations
+  log (bg)| {z }
Brand Fixed E¤ects
+(1    ) log (hgt2m)| {z }
Land Prices
+ log

1 + tg;state;multiplicativet2y

| {z }
State Taxes
+log

1 + tg;federal;multiplicativet2y

| {z }
Federal Taxes
+ "gt|{z}
Residuals
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which can be estimated using time xed e¤ects to measure the time-varying costs of log (W ot (1  Tt)),
renery xed e¤ects to measure log transport costs of crude oil from the oil eld to the renery
log (1 +  or), log distance to the renery log (d
g
r) to measure transportation costs of gasoline
from the renery to the gas station, log standard deviation of nighttime lights log (g) to mea-
sure the size and spatial distribution of economic activity around gas station g, log number
of gas stations log
fN g around gas station g, brand xed e¤ects to measure brand-specic
costs log (bg), time-varying log Zillow Home Value Index at the zip-code level to measure
land prices log (hgt2m), time-varying state taxes calculated by Equation 7.5 for di¤erent years
(e.g., 2010 versus 2011) to measure log

1 + tstate;multiplicativet

, and federal taxes calculated
by Equation 7.6 to measure

1 + tfederal;multiplicativet

; the unexplained part (i.e., residuals of
"gt ) are assumed to represent the measurement errors. Since state and federal taxes have a
coe¢ cient of one in front of them, we use restricted least squares for the estimation.10
4.2. Variance Decomposition Analysis
Although the regression analysis depicts how the gasoline prices change with right hand side
(RHS) variables, it cannot explain the contribution of each RHS variable on the variance of
gasoline prices across gas stations, which is a natural measure of gasoline price dispersion.
Note that the variance decomposition analysis also depicts the percentage of total sum of
squares explained by each RHS variable; i.e., it decomposes the contribution of each RHS
variable on the R-squared measure. Accordingly, using the estimated parameters and the
10It is important to emphasize that we cannot identify the individual parameters of ,  or , while we can
identify  and . Nevertheless, their identication is not necessary for the variance decomposition analysis,
below, where all we need is the overall tted value of each component on the right hand side of Equation 4.1.
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tted values coming from the estimation of Equation 4.1, we will conduct a variance decom-
position analysis where we will further investigate the role of each explanatory variable on
the variance of gasoline prices across gas stations as follows:
var
 
logRgs;t

= cov ( log (W ot (1 + Tt)t) ; logR
g
t )| {z }
Time Fixed E¤ects
+ cov ( log (1 +  or) ; logR
g
t )| {z }
Renery Fixed E¤ects
+cov ( log (dgr) ; logR
g
t )| {z }
Distance to Renery
  cov ( log (g) ; logRgt )| {z }
S.D. of Nighttime Lights
 cov

(1  ) log
fN g ; logRgt| {z }
# of Nearby Stations
+ cov ( log (bg) ; logRgt )| {z }
Brand Fixed E¤ects
+cov ((1    ) log (hgt2m) ; logRgt )| {z }
Zillow Home Value Index
+cov

log

1 + tg;state;multiplicativet2y

; logRgt

| {z }
State Taxes
+cov

log

1 + tg;federal;multiplicativet2y

; logRgt

| {z }
Federal Taxes
+ cov ("gt ; logR
g
t )| {z }
Residuals
where var is the operator of variance and cov is the operator of covariance.
4.3. Empirical Results
The estimation results of Equation 4.1 are given in Table 2 where di¤erent spatial mea-
sures (as introduced in the Data Appendix) have been considered. In all regressions, brand,
renery, and time xed e¤ects have been included. As is evident, local agglomeration exter-
17
nalities of spatial gasoline demand (measured by the standard deviation of nighttime lights)
and the number of local competitors have negative and signicant e¤ects on gasoline prices
as expected by the model. In terms of their magnitudes, one percent of an increase in local
externalities can lower gasoline prices as much as 1.92%, while one percent of an increase in
the number of competitors can lower gasoline prices as much as 0.19%. Distribution costs
of gasoline from the nearest rener to the gas station have positive and signicant e¤ects,
also as expected; one percent of an increase in distribution costs leads to an increase up to
about 0.41% in gasoline prices. The e¤ects of land prices are also positive and signicant (as
expected) where one percent of an increase in land prices leads to an increase up to about
0.79% in gasoline prices. Also considering the unit coe¢ cients in front of state and federal
taxes (through restricted least squares), the R-squared values are all about 0.90, which is
promising.
Although an R-squared value of 0.90 is a high measure of t, we would like to know
the contribution of each RHS variable on this value. Accordingly, we depict the variance
decomposition of log gasoline prices (across time and space) in Table 3 where the percentage
contribution of each RHS variable is depicted for di¤erent spatial measures. As is evident,
the highest contribution to the gasoline price dispersion of about 51% is by time xed e¤ects,
followed by renery xed e¤ects contributing up to 33%, state taxes contributing about 12%,
spatial demand contributing up to 2%, land prices contributing up to about 1.4%, the number
of local competitors contributing up to 0.3%, and distribution costs contributing up to 0.1%.
The contribution of brand xed e¤ects on the gasoline price dispersion, however, is very
minor, ranging between  0:5% and  0:1% that can be considered as a smoothing e¤ect of
discount gasoline stations. Since additive federal taxes were common across all gas stations,
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their multiplicative version has another smoothing e¤ect on gasoline price dispersion; federal
taxes reduce gasoline price dispersion by more than 7%.
Overall, since time xed e¤ects can be thought as nationwide e¤ects (because they capture
any e¤ect common across all gas stations within the U.S.), we can claim that about half of
the gasoline price dispersion (across time and space) is due to nationwide e¤ects, and the
remaining half is due to spatial factors.
5. Discussion and Robustness
This section questions the RHS variables that have been included in the regression analysis,
provides alternative RHS measures for robustness, and discusses the empirical results through
comparisons with the existing literature.
Although the model implies that we should be including all the RHS variables in the
regression analysis, is their inclusion statistically signicant? To answer this question, for
each spatial measure, we used several F-tests to compare the full version of the model with
its restricted versions where we excluded one set of RHS variables (e.g., spatial gasoline
demand, brand xed e¤ects or time xed e¤ects) at a time. Under the null hypothesis that
the restrictions are valid, the F-test results suggested that p values are virtually equal to
zero; hence, all restrictions were rejected, or the full version of the model was accepted as
the correct version of the model.
According to the empirical results, the gasoline price dispersion is mostly determined by
time xed e¤ects. Although they have been included in the analysis to capture the e¤ects
of crude oil prices, they may be capturing any other time varying e¤ect that is common
19
across all gas stations as well (e.g., weekend, weekday, or before-holiday pricing strategies).
When we compared estimated time xed e¤ects with daily crude oil prices, we obtained a
correlation coe¢ cient of about 0.87 (for all ve spatial measures that we considered); hence,
time xed e¤ects in fact mostly capture crude oil prices during the sample period. The
di¤erence between time xed e¤ects and crude oil prices can mostly be attributable to the
transmission of crude oil prices to retail-level gasoline prices (or daily pricing strategies) as
we discussed above. Nevertheless, for robustness, we had an alternative analysis where we
replaced time xed e¤ects with crude oil prices. In such a case, the contribution of crude oil
prices to the gasoline price dispersion (through our variance decomposition analysis) has been
estimated as about 38% or 39% (depending on the spatial measure considered) where the
di¤erence between the contribution of time xed e¤ects (about 51%) and crude oil prices has
shown up in the residuals (of which contribution increased from about 10% to about 22%).11
Therefore, replacing time xed e¤ects with crude oil prices does not alter the result that the
main contribution to the overall gasoline price dispersion during our sample period is by crude
oil prices. This result is consistent with Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2007) who show using a panel
of monthly observations at the state level for the 19891997 period that almost the entire
variation in national gasoline prices is due to a rise in the price of crude oil and that across-
state variation can be attributed to demand variation, as well as di¤erences in taxes. We also
show that di¤erences in spatial demand and taxes are important in explaining gasoline price
dispersion, however, in addition to Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2007), we have shown that renery
xed e¤ects also have signicant e¤ects (e.g., about 1/3 of the gasoline price dispersion is
11Compared to Table 3, the contributions of other RHS variables on the gasoline price dispersion were
almost the same when time xed e¤ectes were replaced by daily crude oil prices.
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due to renery xed e¤ects).
Compared to the studies focusing on gas-station level gasoline prices (that we discussed
during the literature review, above), showing the contribution of renery xed e¤ects to the
gasoline price dispersion is the main nuance of this paper. The main reason for other papers
ignoring such e¤ects were either due to the lack of a comprehensive data set and/or the
lack of modeling such e¤ects. Nevertheless, the high contribution of renery xed e¤ects in
this paper can be connected to studies for other countries at more aggregated levels such as
the one by Sen (2003) who shows using a panel data set of monthly city-level prices for 11
Canadian cities over the 19911997 period that wholesale prices (captured by renery xed
e¤ects in this paper) play a larger role in retail price determination than city level market
structure (captured by spatial demand or land prices in this paper).
Since the number of gas stations around gas station g measured by fN g in our gasoline
price data set may not be capturing the actual number of gas stations, as an alternative, we
used the average nighttime lights ms to proxy for fN g as discussed, above. The corresponding
analysis suggested that although the average nighttime lights a have negative and signicant
coe¢ cient estimate, its contribution to the gasoline price dispersion is still at most about
1.5%. Moreover, although their coe¢ cient estimates were found to be signicant, the contri-
butions of brand xed e¤ects and spatial demand to the gasoline price dispersion were found
to be minor (in both benchmark and alternative analyses) as well. However, recall that the
studies focusing on gas-station level gasoline prices (mentioned above) have mostly empha-
sized the e¤ects of the brand of gasoline (measured by brand xed e¤ects in this paper),
spatial gasoline demand, and local competition on the gasoline price dispersion. One reason
for this di¤erence may be the focus on local or small markets by such other studies, because,
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by focusing on the overall U.S. market, this paper can capture the big picture of the gasoline
market. To be more specic, consider a special case of our model where we would focus on
a very local market for a specic day where all gas stations purchase gasoline from the very
same renery. In such a case, gas stations would have very similar gasoline prices with each
other, because they would be subject to very similar time xed e¤ects, renery xed e¤ects,
state taxes, land prices, and gasoline distribution costs; for sure, the only remaining factors
to capture the price dispersion between these local gas stations would then be the brand
xed e¤ects, spatial demand, and local competition. Therefore, focusing on the overall U.S.
market is in fact the key here.
6. Conclusion
Using a unique comprehensive gasoline price data at the gas-station level, this paper has
achieved a spatial analysis to explain the determinants of the gasoline prices and their dis-
persion across space and time within the U.S.. The results suggest that about half of the
gasoline price dispersion (across time and space) is due to nationwide e¤ects, and the re-
maining half is due to spatial factors. The change in gasoline prices through time is mostly
explained by crude oil prices, and the spatial gasoline price dispersion is mostly explained by
renery xed e¤ects followed by state-level taxes.
Compared to the existing literature that emphasize the role of gasoline brands and local
density of stations on gasoline prices, we have shown that the contribution of such e¤ects
are relatively minor after controlling for other/spatial determinants of gasoline prices (e.g.,
spatial gasoline demand, distribution costs of gasoline, and land prices). The main reason for
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the results of this paper being di¤erent compared to the existing literature is due to having
a nationwide gasoline price data within the U.S., whereas existing studies (at the gas station
level) for the U.S. have mostly focused on local markets with only a couple of cities/states
involved in the spatial analysis. As discussed in more details in the text, having such a local-
level analysis would suppress the main determinants of gasoline prices, such as renery e¤ects,
because many gas stations within the same location would already face similar local input
costs due to purchasing gasoline from the same (or closeby) reners. In contrast, employing a
nationwide spatial analysis in this paper has allowed for comparisons across locations, which
have resulted in depicting the high contribution of renery xed e¤ects (among others, as
discussed, above) to the spatial gasoline-price dispersion.
Our analysis is not without caveats. Due to the lack of available data, unlike Ning and
Haining (2003), Barron et al. (2004), Eckert and West (2004, 2005), or Hosken et al. (2008),
the model of this paper has not considered any gas station characteristics (e.g., having a car
wash or repair service) either. Also, we have mostly focused on the spatial (rather than a
time series or a "full" panel) dimension of gasoline price determination due to the unbalanced
panel nature of the gasoline price data, and we have not considered any dynamics, such as
spatial variables interacting with time xed e¤ects in the regression analysis; considering
such interactions through appropriate modeling for unbalanced panels would result in richer
dynamics, although they were not the focus of this paper.
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7. Appendix: Data
The details of the data required to estimate the log version of 3.14 are depicted in this section
which literally connects Equation 4.1 to Equation 3.14 in the main text.
7.1. Data for Prices
We collected the regular gasoline prices per gallon Rgt covering 50 states of the U.S., together
with District of Columbia, from www.gasbuddy.com on a daily basis between September 10th,
2010 and January 31st, 2011 (i.e., for 144 days). GasBuddy.com is a network of web sites in
the United States that operates under many local domain names such as MiamiGasPrices.com
or NewYorkGasPrices.com. Individuals post the gasoline prices that they have seen around
them to these web sites; in return, they earn points that can be used to enter ra­ es for prizes
such as $250 gas cards. Atkinson (2008) has cross checked the validity of the price data
collected from GasBuddy.com by using other independent gasoline price data and concluded
that the data obtained from GasBuddy.com can in fact be used to examine spatial price
competition, both within and across markets.
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We downloaded the data at around 8pm each and every day during the sample period.
This is the rst paper introducing and using this data set. These are regular gasoline prices
at the gas station level where the location information is as good as the actual address of
the gas station in the U.S..12 The brand of the gas station is also available (which we use
to create brand xed e¤ects to measure bgss in the regression analysis). A typical gasoline
price observation that we have is a price of $2.73 on October 15th, 2010 from the gas station
brand of "Murphy USA" located at "8922 N Terre Haute Rd, Paris, IL". Since the data on
the web page have been submitted by actual individuals, there were some problems, such
as typos in the addresses, or digit errors made while typing the prices. For the former, we
have ltered the data by matching the addresses with the Google Map addresses; when they
matched (i.e., when the actual address could be found by Google Map with an accuracy of
7, 8 or 9, where 9 is the best level of accuracy at the exact location name and address level,
8 is the accuracy at the address level, and 7 is the accuracy at the level of intersection of
roads according to the standards of the Google Map system), we kept the price observation
and further obtained the latitude and longitude, together with zip codes (which we use to
match the gasoline price data with land prices), of each and every gas station in our sample.
For the latter, we ltered the price data by ignoring the price observations that are at least
two times higher or lower than the average gas prices for a specic day. After such a data
cleaning process, we ended up with 469,408 (i.e., close to half a million) price observations.
12In other contexts, studies such as by Byrne et al. (2015) have also used daily gasoline price data sets for
a couple of cities obtained from similar web pages, but the data set of this paper is the most comprehensive
one to our knowledge, because rather than just a couple of cities, it covers gas stations from all states of the
U.S..
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These gasoline price observations belong to 38,245 di¤erent gas stations; hence, on average,
we have about 12 days of gasoline price observation per gas station. The spatial distribution
of gas stations can also be found on a map of the U.S. in Figure 1.
The descriptive statistics of the gasoline price data are given in Table 1 where details
at the state-level are provided for presentational purposes; these are the numbers providing
the motivation of this paper. The left panel of Table 1 (after the rst column) provides
information on gasoline prices for the pooled sample of all locations and all time periods.
Accordingly, during the sample period, the highest price has been recorded as $4.26 from
Washington D.C. and the lowest price has been recorded as $2 from various states. The
median gasoline price has been $2.79. The highest (lowest) standard deviation has been
recorded as 0.25 (0.05) from Washington D.C. (Utah), followed by 0.21 (0.08) from Alaska
(Montana). Among the minimum (maximum) prices across states, the standard deviation is
0.28 (0.30), while, among the median (mean) prices across states, the standard deviation is
0.19 (0.18).
The middle panel of Table 1 provides further information on the price dispersion across
states. In particular, the maximum gasoline price di¤erence between any two gas stations is
calculated for each state and for each day as follows:
state !
Rgt = max (R
g
t j state) min (Rgt j state)
Then, across time, the other statistics are calculated according to
state !
Rgt ; e.g., the column
min for any state is calculated by nding the minimum value of
state !
Rgt across t. Therefore,
the maximum price di¤erence for a typical state in a typical day was as high as $1.57 (for
Washington D.C.) and as low as $0 (for Alaska). The maximum price di¤erence on a typical
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day, which can be measured for any given state by the median of the maximum price di¤erence
across the whole sample is also given in Table 1, where Hawaii has the highest value of $0.60,
while states such as Florida, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Wisconsin share
the lowest value of $0.08. Such di¤erences across states are also shown in Figure 2 on the
U.S. map for the maximum price di¤erence on a typical day. As is evident, Mountain and
West North Central States (dened according to Census Regions and Divisions of the United
States) have higher price di¤erences across gas stations. According to Table 1, the standard
deviation (across time) of the maximum price di¤erence was as high as 0.60 (for Hawaii)
and as low as 0.09 (for New Hampshire). In sum, there were high levels of gasoline price
dispersion, even within states/districts, during the sample period.
7.2. Data for Economic Activity and Spatial Measures
To capture the part of the local agglomeration externalities through fGg in Equation 3.14 (that
have negative e¤ects on gas-station-level gasoline prices), since we have a spatial analysis of
gasoline prices, we need corresponding spatial data for the size and spatial distribution of
economic activity around gas station g. Accordingly, we use the standard deviation of the
nighttime lights around gas station g as a proxy for fGg:
fGg = (g) (7.1)
where g represents the standard deviation of nighttime lights (across space) around gas
station g. It is important to emphasize that standard deviation is a measure that can capture
both the size/scale and the distribution of nighttime lights13; hence, it is a perfect match to
13Because, as is well known in statistics, standard deviation is a measure that captures both the scale
and the variation in a distribution. If one would like to have a pure measure of spatial distribution of
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capture the expected negative e¤ects of fGg. Our motivation comes out of many studies that
have shown the almost-perfect correlation between economic activity and nighttime lights
(e.g., see Croft 1978, Elvidge et al. 1997, Sutton and Costanza 2002, Ebener et al. 2005, Doll
et al. 2006, Sutton et al. 2007, and Ghosh et al. 2009, among many others). However, this
is the rst paper we are aware of that uses the spatial distribution of nighttime lights data
to measure the spatial distribution of economic activity. The average (rather than standard
deviation of) nighttime lights would denitely be a measure of economic activity, but it cannot
capture the spatial distribution of economic activity; we rather save the average measure of
nighttime lights to measure the economic activity of individuals and for a robustness analysis,
where we use it as an alternative proxy for the number of gas stations.
To capture the size of economic activity of individual s, Xs, we use the nighttime light
of location s (i.e., the location of individual s) as a proxy:
Xs = (n
s) (7.2)
where ns is the nighttime light of location s. Similarly, to capture the spatial distribution
of economic activity around individual s, Ds, we use the coe¢ cient of variation (dened as
standard deviation over mean) of the nighttime lights around individual s as a proxy:
Ds =

s
ms

(7.3)
where s represents the standard deviation and ms represents the average nighttime lights
(across space) around individual s.
economic activity (that is independent of the size/scale), one should better consider a measure like coe¢ cient
of variation dened as the standard deviation over mean, which is accepted to be a normalized measure of
dispersion.
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In technical terms, the nighttime lights are measured for each 30-arc-second grids, span-
ning  65 to 75 degrees latitude and  180 to 180 degrees longitude around the world; ob-
viously, we only use the part of the nighttime lights for the U.S. To give the reader a bet-
ter idea, although the exact measure is based on the exact spatial location (due to the
spherical shape of the earth), on average, one 30-arc-second grid correspond to a space
about 25(= 5  5) square blocks or 0:25 (= 0:5 0:5) square miles in the U.S.; there-
fore, these 30-arc-second grids are natural minimum measures in our analysis to create
di¤erent spatial location concepts. Accordingly, to connect the data to the model, we as-
sume that each 30-arc-second grid is occupied by a potential individual, say, individual
s in the model. In Figure 3, an approximate typical example of one 30-arc-second grid
in Chicago, IL is given by the area/space between "166 W Washington St, Chicago, IL
60602" and "520 S Michigan Ave, Chicago, IL 60605" which corresponds to the location
s 2 Slats ; Slons  where Slats = [41:8753797; 41:8834904] represents the latitude interval and
Slons = [ 87:6330631; 87:6245221] represents the longitude interval of the area between the
two addresses.
In the model, it is the individuals who travel for economic activity and purchase gasoline.
Although we match each 30-arc-second grid with a potential individual, we also need to
match the travel patterns of individuals with spatial measures of locations to identify the
phrases that we have been using so far, "around individual s" and "around gas station g".
Accordingly, the spatial location measures we consider in the empirical analysis is to capture
the travel patterns of individuals. For example, if we would use only one 30-arc-second grid
as our spatial measure, "around individual s" or "around gas station g" would correspond to
25 square blocks (or 0.25 square miles) in the U.S. on average, and if we would use hundred
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30-arc-second grids as our spatial measure, they would correspond to 2; 500(= 5050) square
blocks (or 25 square miles) in the U.S. on average. When "around individual s" and "around
gas station g" intersect with each other on the map, it means that individual s has a demand
for gasoline at gas station g given by Equation 3.8; hence, the gas stations located within the
travel patterns of individuals are potential suppliers of gasoline.
In formal terms, we consider ve di¤erent measures of spatial location.
Spatial Measure #1: Since we compute the spatial distribution of economic activity
by the coe¢ cient of variation of nighttime lights across 30-arc-second grids in Equation 7.1,
we need nighttime light data from several grids to obtain a standard deviation measure. So,
to nd the intersection of "around individual s" and "around gas station g" on the map,
for each gas station g, after nding the 30-arc-second grid at which gas station g is located
(by matching the latitude and longitude of the gas station with the same information from
the nighttime lights data), we consider 5 additional 30-arc-second grids (about 2.5 miles) to
the north, south, west, and east of the gas stations grid. This would correspond to a space
consisting of 121 30-arc-second grids around gas station g. It is also important to emphasize
that we have the nighttime light data for every 30-arc-second grid; hence, we have enough
number of observations to calculate the standard deviation of nighttime lights g across these
grids.
Spatial Measure #2: A larger version of Spatial Measure #1, this time with 10 ad-
ditional 30-arc-second grids (about 5 miles) to the north, south, west, and east of the gas
stations 30-arc-second grid. This would correspond to a space consisting of 441 30-arc-second
grids or 110 square miles around the gas station considered.
Spatial Measure #3: A larger version of Spatial Measure #1, this time with 25 addi-
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tional 30-arc-second grids (about 12.5 miles) to the north, south, west, and east of the gas
stations 30-arc-second grid. This would correspond to a space consisting of 2,601 30-arc-
second grids or 650 square miles around the gas station considered.
Spatial Measure #4: A larger version of Spatial Measure #1, this time with 50 ad-
ditional 30-arc-second grids (about 25 miles) to the north, south, west, and east of the gas
stations 30-arc-second grid. This would correspond to a space consisting of 10,201 30-arc-
second grids or 2,550 square miles around the gas station considered.
Spatial Measure #5: A larger version of Spatial Measure #1, this time with 100
additional 30-arc-second grids (about 50 miles) to the north, south, west, and east of the gas
stations 30-arc-second grid. This would correspond to a space consisting of 40,401 30-arc-
second grids or 10,100 square miles around the gas station considered.
One may be curious about why we have considered a spatial measure up to about 10,100
square miles around the gas station. Our motivation comes from the National Household
Travel Survey (for the year of 2009) that has collected data on both long-distance and local
travel by the American public. According to this survey, on average, an individual has
traveled (one-way) about 36 miles per day, and an individual has driven (one-way) about 29
miles per day. Since an individual has the option to purchase gasoline from any location on
her (one-way) route, considering spatial measures up to 10,100 square miles (i.e., one-way
routes up to 50 miles) around the gas station just covers the demand patterns of a typical
gasoline consumer in the U.S.
The nighttime lights data have been obtained from the web page of the National Geo-
physical Data Center.14 The data set is the part of "Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights
14The nighttime light les are cloud-free composites made using all the available archived DMSP-OLS
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Time Series" for 2010. Within this data set, we use two di¤erent measures of nighttime lights:
(i) Average Visible, Stable Lights, and Cloud Free Coverages; and (ii) The nighttime lights
product known as "avg_lights_x_pct" which is derived from the average visible band digital
number of cloud-free light detections multiplied by the percent frequency of light detection.15
The empirical results that we depict have been obtained by using the latter; but, the results
were almost exactly the same when we used the former.
7.3. Data for Number of Gas Stations
To capture the part of the local agglomeration externalities through fN g in Equation 3.14 (that
have negative e¤ects on gas-station-level gasoline prices), we have calculated the number of
gas stations fN g around gas station g (in Equation 3.14) as the number of gas stations for
which we have price data at least once during our sample period of 144 days. The number of
gas stations for each state/district (for the pooled sample through time) is given in the rst
column of Table 1 where the numbers range between 1,609 (for Ohio) and 88 (for Washington
D.C.) with a total of 38,245. The number of gas stations per day ranges between 3,480 and
3,840.
Many earlier studies have also investigated the contribution of local station density (mea-
sured by fN g in this paper) by considering di¤erent measures of spatial locations. For example,
Hosken et al. (2008) and Barron et al. (2004) have considered the number of stations within
smooth resolution data for the calendar year of 2010.
15In the latter, the inclusion of the percent frequency of detection term normalizes the resulting digital
values for variations in the persistence of lighting. For instance, the value for a light only detected half the
time is discounted by 50%. Note that this product contains detections from res and a variable amount of
background noise. This is the product used to infer gas aring volumes from the nighttime lights.
36
a 1.5 mile radius, while Eckert and West (2005) have considered a 2 kilometer radius, and
Van Meerbeeck (2003) has considered the number of stations within the same municipality.
To be consistent with our spatial measures introduced above, we calculated the number of
gas stations fN g in our sample (by using their latitudes and longitudes from Google Map)
depending on our di¤erent spatial measures, above. Therefore, compared to the existing
literature, we focus on more than one spatial measure to calculate the number of station.
We are well aware that fN g (i.e., number of gas stations for which we have price data at
least once during our sample period of 144 days) may not be capturing the actual number
of gas stations around gas station g; hence, as an alternative, in the robustness/regression
analysis, we also used the average nighttime lights mg around gas station g as a proxy for
fN g because of the trivial conjecture that the number of gas stations is correlated with the
economic activity around gas station g.
7.4. Data for Reners
Since we havent modeled the petroleum bulk stations and distribution terminals (for sim-
plicity, because of the lack of available location data for such stations/terminals, and be-
cause of the lack of data on possible contracts between terminals and gas stations), we
assumed that gas stations purchase gasoline from the nearest renery as in Chouinard and
Perlo¤ (2007) or Doyle and Samphantharak (2008). We considered the possibility of gas
stations purchasing gasoline from Canadian reners as well due to the open nature of trade
between the two countries, as stipulated by the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Accordingly, we obtained the list of gasoline reneries in the U.S. and Canada
from www.globalenergyobservatory.org. Then, we found the exact address, together with
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latitude and longitude, of each and every renery by using various sources on the internet in-
cluding Google Maps, Google Earth, and individual renery web pages. Using such location
information of reneries, we found the nearest renery for each and every gas station in our
sample (i.e., we identied r in W rt ) and calculated the corresponding great-circle distance of
transportation of gasoline from the nearest renery to each gas station (dgr) to be connected
to the gasoline transportation costs (1 +  gr) as follows:
(1 +  gr) = (d
g
r)
 (7.4)
where  is the elasticity of distance to capture the relation between distance and gasoline
transportation costs. The spatial distribution of reners can also be found on a map of
the U.S. in Figure 1 where there are 143 reners from the U.S. and 4 reners from Canada;
Canadian reners are the nearest reners to some gas stations (in our sample) in Northeastern
United States. Note that we also use renery xed e¤ects in the regression analysis, so that
possible border e¤ects (if any) caused by purchasing gasoline from Canadian reners are
captured by such xed e¤ects.
7.5. Data for Land Prices
The land prices (hgts in Equation 3.14) were proxied by the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI)
at the zip-code level. These monthly data have been obtained from www.zillow.com for the
sample period of the gasoline price data. We believe that ZHVI is one of the best available
proxies for land prices because of its spatial coverage (e.g., Zillow appraises about 75% of
the houses in the U.S. several times a week and aggregates these house-level valuations into
indexes at the ZIP code level).16 To match the data with the model, we used the following
16It is important to notice that a house need not to be sold to be included in ZHVI.
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expression:
hgt2m = ZHV Im
where hgt2m is the land price faced by gas station g at day t that belongs to month m (e.g.,
September, 2010), and ZHV Im is the Zillow Home Value Index for monthm. In other words,
the time dimension of land prices are due to changes in monthly home prices.
7.6. Data for Taxes
Since we have the address of each and every gas station, it was trivial to identify the
state in which the gas station operates and to obtain gasoline taxes at the state level from
www.taxfoundation.org for both 2010 and 2011. The state-level taxes per gallon of gasoline,
which include taxes paid both to the state governments and other local governments, are
given in the right panel of Table 1 where they range between 8 and 46.6 cents for 2010 and
between 8 and 49.6 cents for 2011. The standard deviation of taxes across states is 8.5 for
2010 and 9.5 for 2011. The federal tax on gasoline (which is common across states) for both
2010 and 2011 was 18.4 cents per gallon.
However, the obtained gasoline taxes (at both state and federal levels) are in additive
(rather than multiplicative) terms. Hence, to connect the data to our model (where taxes
are in multiplicative terms), we have to use a transformation of taxes from additive to mul-
tiplicative form. Accordingly, for state-level taxes, we used the following transformation for
any gas station:
tstate;multiplicativet =
tstate;additivet
Rgt   tfederal;additivet   tstate;additivet
(7.5)
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and, for federal taxes, we used the following transformation:
tfederal;multiplicativet =
tfederal;additivet
Rgt   tfederal;additivet   tstate;additivet
(7.6)
where both tstate;multiplicativet and t
federal;multiplicative
t may di¤er across gas stations (even within
any state), since they represent taxes as percentage of retail gasoline prices (that may be
di¤erent across gas stations) for a specic day. Finally, to connect the model to the multi-
plicative state-level and federal taxes, we used the following expression for gas station g:
 
1 + tgt2y

=

1 + tg;state;multiplicativet2y

1 + tg;federal;multiplicativet2y

where tg;state;multiplicativet2y and t
g;federal;multiplicative
t2y are the tax rates faced by gas station g at
time t that belongs to year y.
An alternative would be to subtract the summation of state-level and federal additive
taxes from the retail gasoline prices at the gas station level and conduct the empirical analy-
sis without taxes; however, in such a case, it would not be possible to have a variance
decomposition analysis to show the contribution of taxes to the gasoline price dispersion,
since such an analysis requires linearity (either in logs or levels) to be tractable.
7.7. Data for Crude Oil Prices
We use time xed e¤ects to capture the e¤ects of daily crude oil prices in the regression
analysis. Although we have a rough justication through our model that (1  Tt) captures
time-varying subsidies/transfers to reners, the empirical reason for using time xed e¤ects
rather than using the actual crude oil prices is that crude oil prices may be reected by gas
stations after a certain period of time. For example, Borenstein et al. (1997) show that one
cent of an increase in crude oil prices leads to an increase of 0.55 cents in gasoline prices in
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the rst two weeks and further 0.12 cent increase in the next two weeks, and for a 0.67 cents
increase after four weeks; moreover, the response of retail gasoline prices may be di¤erent
between an increase and a decrease in crude oil prices or the transmission of shocks from
crude oil prices to gasoline prices can be a¤ected di¤erently by supply and demand factors
as in Kilian (2010). Since the focus of this paper is the spatial analysis of gasoline prices, we
simply ignore the dynamic transmission mechanism of crude oil price changes into the retail-
level gasoline prices and use time xed e¤ects to capture daily crude oil prices. Nevertheless,
for robustness, we alternatively replace time xed e¤ects with daily crude oil prices (of West
Texas Intermediate obtained from www.eia.gov) to compare the estimated time xed e¤ects
with daily crude oil prices.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable     Gasoline Prices   Maximum Gasoline Price Difference   State-Level Taxes 
Sample 
  
Pooled Sample 
 
Across Time (A Typical Day) 
 
Cents per Gallon 
STATE # of Stations   Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. 
 
2010 2011 
Alabama 822  
 
2.27 2.95 2.63 2.67 0.15 
 
0.04 0.22 0.09 0.04 0.10 
 
20.9  30.9  
Alaska 155  
 
3.23 4.03 3.38 3.41 0.09 
 
0.00 0.64 0.25 0.13 0.31 
 
8.0  8.0  
Arizona 581  
 
2.29 2.89 2.61 2.62 0.12 
 
0.08 0.30 0.13 0.04 0.14 
 
19.0  19.0  
Arkansas 628  
 
2.00 2.95 2.64 2.67 0.15 
 
0.06 0.78 0.13 0.07 0.14 
 
21.8  21.8  
California 1,267  
 
2.00 3.19 2.97 2.98 0.14 
 
0.05 0.94 0.11 0.12 0.14 
 
46.6  49.1  
Colorado 767  
 
2.00 2.85 2.59 2.61 0.10 
 
0.07 0.58 0.14 0.05 0.15 
 
22.0  22.0  
Connecticut 651  
 
2.09 3.27 3.04 2.99 0.19 
 
0.08 0.84 0.14 0.09 0.15 
 
41.9  49.6  
Delaware 216  
 
2.00 3.39 2.89 2.87 0.19 
 
0.06 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.18 
 
23.0  23.5  
Washington DC 88  
 
2.57 4.26 3.08 3.09 0.25 
 
0.01 1.57 0.44 0.31 0.49 
 
23.5  23.0  
Florida 1,509  
 
2.09 3.04 2.72 2.76 0.16 
 
0.03 0.78 0.08 0.10 0.11 
 
34.5  34.5  
Georgia 950  
 
2.00 2.94 2.63 2.66 0.15 
 
0.06 0.51 0.11 0.06 0.13 
 
12.4  29.2  
Hawaii 245  
 
3.15 4.14 3.47 3.53 0.21 
 
0.14 0.76 0.60 0.06 0.60 
 
44.4  47.4  
Idaho 463  
 
2.42 3.29 2.87 2.86 0.10 
 
0.14 0.64 0.26 0.09 0.28 
 
25.0  25.0  
Illinois 1,275  
 
2.08 3.08 2.79 2.82 0.14 
 
0.06 0.71 0.11 0.07 0.13 
 
39.0  41.2  
Indiana 1,356  
 
2.16 3.09 2.75 2.76 0.16 
 
0.05 0.31 0.12 0.04 0.12 
 
34.1  39.7  
Iowa 855  
 
2.00 3.09 2.79 2.82 0.13 
 
0.12 0.99 0.23 0.11 0.26 
 
22.0  22.0  
Kansas 605  
 
2.43 3.05 2.69 2.73 0.14 
 
0.05 0.26 0.12 0.04 0.12 
 
25.0  25.0  
Kentucky 762  
 
2.42 3.04 2.73 2.75 0.14 
 
0.08 0.39 0.17 0.06 0.18 
 
22.5  27.8  
Louisiana 644  
 
2.10 2.91 2.63 2.66 0.14 
 
0.08 0.55 0.14 0.05 0.15 
 
20.0  20.0  
Maine 447  
 
2.51 3.17 2.96 2.92 0.17 
 
0.05 0.18 0.10 0.03 0.10 
 
31.0  31.5  
Maryland 662  
 
2.29 3.03 2.77 2.77 0.17 
 
0.06 0.37 0.13 0.04 0.13 
 
23.5  23.5  
Massachusetts 822  
 
2.25 3.05 2.84 2.79 0.18 
 
0.06 0.53 0.12 0.05 0.13 
 
23.5  23.5  
Michigan 1,560  
 
2.00 3.05 2.80 2.80 0.14 
 
0.04 0.91 0.10 0.12 0.13 
 
35.0  40.8  
Minnesota 1,168  
 
2.00 3.11 2.78 2.82 0.14 
 
0.04 0.89 0.08 0.07 0.09 
 
27.2  27.2  
Mississippi 810  
 
2.30 2.95 2.65 2.68 0.15 
 
0.08 0.39 0.16 0.05 0.17 
 
18.8  18.8  
Missouri 1,288  
 
2.00 2.89 2.58 2.61 0.14 
 
0.04 0.61 0.10 0.08 0.12 
 
17.3  17.3  
Montana 353  
 
2.70 3.29 2.89 2.90 0.08 
 
0.17 0.48 0.31 0.06 0.32 
 
27.8  27.8  
Nebraska 597  
 
2.51 3.32 2.89 2.91 0.13 
 
0.11 0.49 0.26 0.07 0.27 
 
27.7  27.2  
Nevada 527  
 
2.00 3.07 2.85 2.85 0.13 
 
0.10 0.86 0.16 0.08 0.18 
 
33.1  33.1  
New Hampshire 361  
 
2.31 3.05 2.85 2.81 0.17 
 
0.05 0.30 0.08 0.03 0.09 
 
19.6  19.6  
New Jersey 1,160  
 
2.15 2.95 2.73 2.68 0.19 
 
0.04 0.34 0.08 0.05 0.10 
 
14.5  14.5  
New Mexico 540  
 
2.14 2.97 2.69 2.71 0.10 
 
0.13 0.75 0.24 0.09 0.26 
 
18.8  18.9  
New York 1,109  
 
2.00 3.26 2.99 2.96 0.19 
 
0.05 0.92 0.14 0.12 0.17 
 
44.6  49.5  
North Carolina 1,110  
 
2.00 2.99 2.69 2.73 0.15 
 
0.04 0.69 0.10 0.08 0.13 
 
30.2  35.3  
North Dakota 312  
 
2.08 3.39 2.94 2.94 0.16 
 
0.15 0.98 0.41 0.09 0.42 
 
23.0  23.0  
Ohio 1,609  
 
2.37 3.02 2.72 2.74 0.14 
 
0.05 0.34 0.12 0.05 0.13 
 
28.0  28.0  
Oklahoma 665  
 
2.37 2.88 2.59 2.62 0.13 
 
0.04 0.24 0.11 0.04 0.11 
 
17.0  17.0  
Oregon 501  
 
2.59 3.15 2.89 2.90 0.11 
 
0.12 0.26 0.18 0.03 0.18 
 
25.0  31.0  
Pennsylvania 951  
 
2.17 3.09 2.85 2.83 0.19 
 
0.04 0.60 0.10 0.08 0.12 
 
32.3  32.5  
Rhode Island 277  
 
2.44 3.55 3.00 2.97 0.19 
 
0.11 0.53 0.22 0.08 0.23 
 
33.0  33.0  
South Carolina 819  
 
2.27 2.87 2.57 2.61 0.15 
 
0.05 0.44 0.10 0.05 0.11 
 
16.8  16.8  
South Dakota 289  
 
2.49 3.29 2.89 2.92 0.14 
 
0.14 0.54 0.32 0.08 0.34 
 
24.0  24.0  
Tennessee 991  
 
2.00 2.89 2.59 2.65 0.15 
 
0.05 0.78 0.10 0.08 0.12 
 
21.4  21.4  
Texas 1,594  
 
2.00 2.85 2.55 2.59 0.15 
 
0.04 0.56 0.11 0.09 0.14 
 
20.0  20.0  
Utah 622  
 
2.30 2.87 2.71 2.72 0.05 
 
0.07 0.47 0.11 0.05 0.12 
 
24.5  24.5  
Vermont 295  
 
2.54 3.34 3.04 2.99 0.19 
 
0.06 0.30 0.17 0.04 0.17 
 
24.5  26.6  
Virginia 731  
 
2.06 2.93 2.61 2.64 0.16 
 
0.07 0.73 0.16 0.07 0.16 
 
19.5  20.0  
Washington 532  
 
2.07 3.13 2.95 2.94 0.10 
 
0.06 0.87 0.13 0.09 0.15 
 
37.5  37.5  
West Virginia 402  
 
2.54 3.19 2.89 2.92 0.14 
 
0.06 0.35 0.15 0.05 0.16 
 
32.2  32.2  
Wisconsin 1,048  
 
2.55 3.05 2.79 2.83 0.13 
 
0.04 0.49 0.08 0.05 0.09 
 
32.9  32.9  
Wyoming 254  
 
2.42 3.09 2.69 2.73 0.13 
 
0.26 0.58 0.41 0.05 0.41 
 
14.0  14.0  
                 Min 88  
 
2.00 2.85 2.55 2.59 0.05 
 
0.00 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.09 
 
8.0 8.0 
Max 1,609  
 
3.23 4.26 3.47 3.53 0.25 
 
0.26 1.57 0.60 0.31 0.60 
 
46.6 49.6 
Median 662  
 
2.25 3.05 2.79 2.80 0.14 
 
0.06 0.56 0.13 0.07 0.14 
 
24.0 25.0 
Mean 750  
 
2.27 3.14 2.81 2.82 0.15 
 
0.07 0.59 0.17 0.07 0.18 
 
26.0 27.5 
Std. Dev. 403    0.28 0.30 0.19 0.18 0.03   0.05 0.27 0.11 0.04 0.11   8.5 9.5 
 
Notes: Min stands for minimum, Max for maximum, Std. Dev. for standard deviation. Pooled sample includes all gas stations from all 144 days 
in the sample period. Maximum price difference has been calculated for each state/district for each day; the numbers in the table show the 
summary statistics of the maximum price difference across time.  
Table 2 - Estimation Results 
Independent Variable 
 
Spatial Measure #1  Spatial Measure #2 Spatial Measure #3 Spatial Measure #4 Spatial Measure #5 
S.D. of Nighttime Lights 
 -0.12 
[-0.13,-0.11] 
-0.23 
[-0.24,-0.21] 
-0.82 
[-0. 85,-0. 78] 
-1.64 
[-1.73,-1.55] 
-1.92 
[-2.06,- 1.78] 
# of Nearby Stations 
 
-0.05 
[-0.08 ,-0.04] 
-0. 12 
[-0.13 ,-0. 09] 
-0.14 
[-0.15,-0.12] 
-0.02 
[-0.06,0.03] 
-0.19 
[-0.24,-0.13] 
Distribution Costs 
 
0. 41 
[0.39,0.43] 
0. 41 
[0.39,0.43] 
0. 36 
[0. 34,0.38] 
0. 25 
[0.23,0.27] 
0.17 
[0.16,0.19] 
Land Prices 
 
0.70 
[0.66,0.74] 
0.65 
[0.61,0.69] 
0.66 
[0.62,0.70] 
0.76 
[0.72,0.80] 
0.79 
[0.75,0.83] 
Brand Fixed Effects 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Refinery Fixed Effects 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Squared 
 
0.9016 0.9006 0.9008 0.9006 0.9004 
Notes: Dependent variable is log gasoline prices. The 5% confidence intervals are in brackets. The estimates and the corresponding intervals 
have been multiplied by 100 for presentational purposes. State and federal taxes have restricted coefficients of one that are not shown.  
 
 
Table 3 - Variance Decomposition of Log Gasoline Prices 
% Explained by 
 
Spatial Measure #1  Spatial Measure #2 Spatial Measure #3 Spatial Measure #4 Spatial Measure #5 
S.D. of Nighttime Lights 
 
-0.35 -0.30 0.42 1.70 2.30 
# of Nearby Stations 
 
0.04 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.25 
Distribution Costs 
 
0.14 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.05 
Land Prices 
 
1.27 1.17 1.19 1.37 1.42 
Brand Fixed Effects  
 
-0.45 -0.33 -0.30 -0.16 -0.05 
State Taxes 
 
11.77 12.19 12.28 12.28 12.28 
Federal Taxes 
 
-6.87 -6.85 -6.84 -6.84 -6.84 
Refinery Fixed Effects 
 
33.44 33.10 32.25 30.86 29.91 
Time Fixed Effects 
 
51.17 50.78 50.73 50.73 50.72 
Residuals 
 
9.84 9.94 9.92 9.94 9.96 
 
 
Figure 1 - Location of Gas Stations and Refiners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Gas stations are represented by blue small dots, and refiners are represented by red large squares. There are four Canadian refiners in 
the northeast of the map; these are the closest refiners to some gas stations (in our sample) in Northeastern United States. 
Figure 2 - Maximum Price Difference on a Typical Day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Notes: For each day, the maximum price difference is calculated across gas stations within each state for each day. This map represents the 
median value (of the maximum price difference) in U.S dollars across all days in the sample. 
Figure 3 - An Approximate Typical Example of One 30-Arc-Second Grid in Chicago, IL 
 
Notes: The source is Google Maps. The transparent area in red represents one 30-arc-second grid.  
 
